Sub-National / -Basin & Local Solutions

At this point, the “Tragedy of the Commons,” which argues that users of a common-pool resource (in this case, water) will inevitably overuse the resource upon which they depend to the point of destruction, has been proven false, most notably by the work of Elinor Ostrom who has found that “successful management involves resources that are effectively managed by small to relatively large groups living within a single country, which involve nested institutions at varying scales” [Ostrom & Field, 1999].

Ostrom has identified what attributes of the resource itself and the appropriators affect the likelihood of successful self-organization to manage local common-pool resources (text adapted from [Ostrom, 2002]):

Feasible improvement: Resource units are not at a point of deterioration such that it is useless to organize or so underutilized that there is little advantage from organizing. Normally, the improvement of a resource is not considered if it is not at risk; however, once a threat emerges, the resource begins to get attention. There is a curvilinear relationship between resource condition and the stimulus to get organized and respond.
Indicators: Reliable and valid indicators of the condition of the resource system are available at a relatively low cost.
Predictability: The flow of resource units is relatively predictable.
Spatial extent: The resource system is sufficiently small, given the transportation and communication technology in use, that appropriators can develop accurate knowledge of external boundaries and internal microenvironments.

In addition to characteristics of the resource required for effective self-governance, there are at least seven prerequisite attributes of the appropriators:

Salience: Appropriators are dependant on the resource system for a major portion of their livelihood or value it highly for other purposes.
Common understanding: Appropriators have a shared image of how the resource system operates and how their actions affect each other and the system.
Discount rate: Appropriators use a low discount rate in relation to future benefits to be achieved from the resource. Appropriators who use a low discount rate, who see a long time into the future as being relevant, are more likely to organize for the future.
Distribution of interests: Appropriators with higher economic and political assets are adversely affected by a lack of coordinated patterns of appropriation and use. This is a complex issue. There are very few resources where everyone is homogeneous. If there is a substantial difference in the economic interest, and if the people who do have greater economic and political assets are those who are interested in the long-term sustainability of the resource, the likelihood of self-organization is higher.
Trust: Appropriators trust one another to keep promises and relate to one another with reciprocity. One of the key factors in the evolution of rules, especially when it is necessary to cut back on resource use, is that participants trust others to follow the agreed-upon rules.
Autonomy: Appropriators are able to determine access and harvesting rules without external authorities countermanding them.
Prior organizational experience: Appropriators have learned at least minimal skills of organization through participation in other local associations or learning about ways that neighboring groups have organized.

Larger-scale governance can authorize local control, help it, hinder it, or override it [Dietz et al., 2003]; at the same time, local governance often relies on larger regimes to (i) provide accurate third-person information; (ii) provide arenas in which participants can engage in discovery, debate, and conflict resolution; and (iii) provide mechanisms for backing up local monitoring and sanctioning [Ostrom, 2002].

“Glocalization” refers to the increased role of local communities in global politics; it assumes both horizontal interaction among states and territories in addition to vertical interaction from village to international community [Hassan et al., 2003]. In fact, “formal and informal ties among regional and local public and private organizations may be more powerful than traditional state authorities” [Hassan et al., 2003]. Local rules that focus on time and not quantity allocations, clearly defined areas of priority use, and protecting downstream and minority rights have been shown to be important for avoiding and resolving conflict as well as creating some system of local justice [Hassan et al., 2003]. Empowering local communities and water users promotes social and environmental accountability and enables all stakeholders to participate in the decision-making process. Moreover, widespread active participation of and cooperation between stakeholders at the local level has also been shown to have a “trickle-up” effect in enhancing security throughout a river basin [Cosgrove, 2003].

Improving access to drinking water and sanitation requires prioritization, investments, and the establishment of sufficient institutional capacity. An example is provided in the following case study that highlights how ownership can be built regarding sustainable water management at the local level.